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Abstract
This study challenges a central assumption of standard trade models: constant marginal cost
technology. We present evidence consistent with the view that increasing marginal cost is
present in the data, and further identify financial and physical capacity constraints as the main
sources of increasing marginal cost. To understand and quantify the importance of increasing
marginal cost faced by financially and physically constrained exporters, we develop a novel
structural estimation framework that incorporates these micro frictions. Our structural esti-
mates suggest that the presence of such capacity constrained firms can (1) reduce aggregate
output responses to external demand shocks by 30% and (2) result in welfare loss by around
23%.
1 Introduction
Standard intermediate microeconomics courses teach that short-run marginal cost is increasing
with output due to fixed factors in production. In practice, most theory models in international
trade assume that firms face constant marginal cost. To the extent that the model is used to study
relatively short-run consequences, these models may be ignoring important features. However,
unless there exists strong evidence to suggest that the assumption is anything other than innocu-
ous, there is little reason to give up the constant marginal cost assumption, not least because its
simplifying nature greatly enhances modeling tractability.
This paper questions the validity of this simplifying assumption. First, we demonstrate robust
evidence for the presence of increasing marginal cost and identify its main sources. We show
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that financial as well as physical capacity constraints give rise to increasing marginal cost. Next,
we build a structural model populated by both constrained and unconstrained firms to quantify
aggregate implications. We find that the presence of constrained firms can significantly reduce
aggregate output responses to external demand shocks, and raise aggregate price level substantially.
Our study begins from the notion that firms with increasing marginal cost face a trade-off
between domestic and export sales — when a firm increases export sales in response to a positive
external demand shock, it will incur an increase in marginal cost, which in turn makes it optimal
for the firm to reduce domestic sales. Firms with constant marginal cost, on the other hand, would
have no incentive to reduce domestic sales in response to a positive export demand shock since
increasing production to meet increased demand abroad has no effect on the level of marginal cost.
Domestic sales of firms with constant marginal cost are therefore independent of their export sales.
Exploring first Indonesian plant-level data, our reduced form approach delivers robust findings
that exporting firms in general face strong trade-offs between domestic and export sales. To identify
the sources of such trade-offs, we investigate if the degree of export-domestic sales trade-offs varies
systematically with characteristics of the firm. The underlying idea is that if the observed patterns
are being driven by increasing marginal cost, we should expect to observe stronger patterns in the
data for capacity constrained firms, as these firms face the steepest cost of increasing production.
We confirm the idea by showing that such systematic patterns exist in the data, measured either
by export status or export sales. We use a capacity utilization variable as a proxy for physical
capacity constraints, and follow the corporate finance literature in classifying financially distressed
firms. The coefficient estimates suggest that (physically and financially) unconstrained firms ex-
hibit no correlation between export and domestic sales growth, whereas being physically or finan-
cially constrained adds about a .2 percentage point reduction in domestic sales growth for each
one-percentage point growth in export sales.
While the results in Indonesia are provocative, the ability to generalize is less clear. To that
end, we employ a second plant-level dataset, this time from Chile. We find nearly identical qual-
itative patterns for Chilean firms as well. Differences in estimated magnitudes between the two
countries are then explored, and we find the differences can be mostly explained by a large number
of intensive exporters in Indonesia that switch in and out of the export market. Chile and Indonesia
represent two very distinct market environments, suggesting that the documented behavior is more
generally applicable in developing market contexts.
Having demonstrated the robustness of this trade-off pattern in the data, we turn next to quan-
tifying aggregate implications. We develop a structural estimation process, and perform counter-
factual exercises. Our contributions in the structural approach are two-fold. First, we build off the
static portion of the seminal structural trade model of Aw et al. (2011). In particular, we consider
capacity constrained firms explicitly, and thus relax the independent markets assumption for these
firms. The novelty in the estimation process lies in exploiting the exporter’s optimality condition
that the marginal revenue in each market is equalized. As part of the process, we are able to recover
firm-level demand curves, which in turn enable us to back out firm-level price and quantity sold in
each market.
The subsequent counterfactual exercises constitute the second major contribution of the paper,
providing quantitative implications of capacity constrained firms. Intuitively, increasing marginal
cost would reduce firms output responses to external demand shocks via offsetting movements in
domestic sales. In addition, capacity constraints lead firms to charge a higher price than would oth-
erwise be optimal. Our structural estimates suggest that the presence of such capacity constrained
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firms can (1) reduce aggregate output responses to external demand shocks by around 30%, and (2)
raise the aggregate price level by around 23%. These counterfactual results suggest that capacity
constrained firms generate important policy implications.1
Related Literature The point of departure for this paper comes from the standard models
of international trade that have followed from the seminal works of Krugman (1979), Krugman
(1980), and Melitz (2003). The key feature of those models for the present purposes is the as-
sumption of constant marginal cost, which allows domestic and foreign markets to be treated as
independent markets in the analysis. This property was made explicit in the recent structural ap-
proaches to international trade, simplifying the estimation process substantially (Das et al. (2007);
Aw et al. (2011)).
We demonstrate that the assumption of constant marginal cost, and hence final goods market
independence, is not supported in the data, and that the assumption is not innocuous. We augment
the static decision problem of Aw et al. (2011) to consider capacity constrained firms, thereby
allowing inter-market dependence for these firms.
There is an emerging literature that explores the relationship between domestic and export
sales as evidence for the presence of increasing marginal cost. Blum et al. (2011) find a negative
correlation between domestic and export sales growth from Chilean firm-level data, which they
attribute to physical capacity constraints. Soderbery (2011) finds a similar pattern when looking
at firm-level data from Thailand, and uses a similar measure of capacity utilization as here to
document the existence of physically constrained firms, but unlike our paper, does not consider
financial dimensions, which are more likely to be beyond the control of individual firms.
Berman et al. (2011) also find a similar pattern from French firm-level data, but find that the
pattern is reversed when they instrument for export sales growth using information on destina-
tion markets. They conjecture that capacity constraints might make foreign and domestic market
sales substitutes, while unconstrained firms might see foreign and domestic sales as complements.
Our results demonstrate that capacity constraints, both physical and financial, do indeed create
trade-offs between foreign and domestic sales. Furthermore, once both capacity constraints and
productivity growth are properly accounted for in the analysis, we show there is no clear relation-
ship between domestic and foreign sales.
Related papers focus on firm-level output volatility, which we document and quantify struc-
turally. Based on a similar observation from French firms covered in the Amadeus database, Van-
noorenberghe (2012) further explores firm-level output volatility, and concludes that the constant
marginal cost assumption may be inappropriate. Nguyen and Schaur (2011) also study the effects
of increasing marginal cost on firm-level volatility using Danish firm-level data. Our paper differs
from these papers in that we explore sources of increasing marginal cost, and develop a structural
estimation model to quantify aggregate implications.
1There is an important distinction between capacity constraints that are a direct consequence of (optimal) firm
investment decisions, and capacity constraints that are due to factors beyond the direct control of the firm. In the
presence of demand uncertainty, firms optimally choose their ex ante capacity level, which ex post may be binding
after the realization of demand shocks. There is little for policy to do in this regard since capacity level is chosen
optimally given available information. However, financial constraints, which are beyond the control of the firm, would
limit the ability of firms to choose the optimal level of physical capacity, leaving more scope for policy interventions.
Our findings on the importance of financial constraints in addition to physical capacity constraints are especially
noteworthy from this perspective.
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Our reduced form approach resembles the strategy used in Fazzari et al. (1988). They start
from the theoretical notion that, in the presence of imperfect financial markets, credit constrained
firms’ investment will be sensitive to their cash flow. Higher cash-flow sensitivity of investment for
credit constrained firms in the data serves as supporting evidence for imperfect financial markets.
In a similar vein, we draw out the implication of constant marginal cost for export and domestic
sales, and find an interrelationship as evidence for increasing marginal cost.
Our finding can serve as direct micro-evidence that justifies the modeling strategy in several
recent papers that consider decreasing returns to scale production or borrowing constraints to ex-
plain salient features of new exporter dynamics (Ruhl and Willis (2008); Kohn et al. (2012); Rho
and Rodrigue (2012)) or patterns of foreign acquisitions (Spearot (2012)).2
This paper is also close to the literature that studies credit constraints and international trade.
Previous studies focus on export fixed costs financing, and thus extensive margin effects of credit
constraints (Chaney (2005); Manova (2011)). Indeed, there is abundant evidence that credit con-
strained firms are less likely to become exporters (Muuˆls (2008), among others). Our paper com-
plements this literature by exploring the intensive margin, and showing that credit constraints af-
fect incumbent exporters as well through the marginal cost channel. This is also consistent with
the trade finance literature that studies intensive margin adjustments during the great trade collapse
(e.g., Ahn (2011); Paravisini et al. (2011)).
One of aggregate implications of capacity constrained firms discussed in this paper offers an
alternative explanation for the short-run trade elasticity puzzle. Ruhl (2008) considers an extensive
margin adjustment in response to temporary and permanent shocks to explain low short-run trade
elasticity and high long-run trade elasticity. Arkolakis et al. (2011) introduces switching frictions
on the customers’ side to generate staggered short-run trade dynamics. Our finding suggests that
exports cannot fully respond to external demand shocks due to inherent capacity constraints at the
firm-level.
The second aggregate implication of capacity constraints relates to the finance and misalloca-
tion literature (e.g., Buera and Shin (2010); Buera et al. (2011); Midrigan and Xu (2010); Buera
and Moll (2012)). Compared to the literature that studies TFP losses from misallocation induced
by financial frictions in a dynamic model, we investigate static welfare losses from financial con-
straints via higher aggregate price levels.
In sum, our paper is the first to identify multiple sources of increasing marginal cost, both
physical and financial, and show that these sources are quite general in developing economies.
These new insights on micro frictions are then incorporated into a structural estimation framework,
which is then used to quantify aggregate implications.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an illustrative theoretical
discussion, and Section 3 describes the firm-level datasets used in this paper. Section 4 reports
empirical findings from the reduced form approach for Indonesia before considering evidence from
Chile. Section 5 develops a structural estimation process, and provides quantifying examples to
gauge the macroeconomic implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2The structural estimation process in Rho and Rodrigue (2012), in particular, is closely related to our paper. Unlike
their approach that imposes and estimates increasing marginal cost across all firms, we separate out constrained and
unconstrained firms based on our reduced-form evidence.
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2 Illustrative Theory
This section aims to provide a simple theoretical framework to contrast different predictions
on the relationship between domestic and export sales movements, depending on the underlying
characteristics of the marginal cost curve. A particular emphasis should be made on the fact that
such predictions neither hinge on any specific model structure, nor require sophisticated theory
models. For each type of marginal cost curve considered below, we begin by finding optimal
sales quantity in each market, and then track the subsequent optimal sales decision in response to
positive external demand shocks. It is important to note that since the area under each marginal
revenue curve corresponds to sales revenues in each market, sales revenues are expected to move
in the same way as quantities sold in each market in what follows.3
Constant marginal cost When a firm’s marginal cost is constant, independent of the total
amount of goods produced, the optimal output for each individual (segmented) market is indepen-
dent of all other markets. In other words, when demand conditions in one market change, the firm
would adjust sales in that particular market, leaving sales in all other markets unchanged.4 This is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Initially, the firm’s optimal operating point in each market is determined by the usual optimality
condition that marginal revenue in each market equals marginal cost (i.e., MRD = MRF = MC∗).
For given domestic and export demand curves, this condition gives the optimal output for the
domestic market, Q∗D, and the optimal export volume, Q
∗
F , with total output being given by Q
∗ =
Q∗D + Q
∗
F . Now, suppose the firm experiences a positive foreign demand shock, which shifts up
both the export demand curve and the marginal revenue curve in the export market. In response,
the optimal export volume increases from Q∗F to Q
∗∗
F at which point the optimality condition in the
export market is satisfied with the new marginal revenue curve (i.e., MR′F(Q
∗∗
F ) = MC
∗). Since
the marginal cost and the domestic marginal revenue curves are unchanged, the optimal output for
the domestic market is unchanged at Q∗d. In sum, constant marginal cost technology predicts that,
other things equal, exports respond to export demand shocks, but domestic sales are unaffected at
the firm-level.
Increasing marginal cost When a firm’s marginal cost increases with the total amount of
goods produced, optimal outputs for each segmented market are no longer independent of each
other. When demand conditions in one market change, the firm would adjust the sales in that
market. This, in turn, alters the marginal cost, which would affect the optimal production decision
in the other market. The situation with increasing marginal cost is illustrated in Figure 2.
At the initial equilibrium with Q∗D, Q
∗
F and Q
∗ = Q∗D + Q
∗
F , the firm satisfies the optimality
condition by equating marginal revenue from each market with marginal cost (i.e., MRD(Q∗D) =
MRF(Q∗F) = MC(Q
∗)). Now, suppose again that there occurs a positive export demand shock,
which shifts up the marginal revenue curve in the export market. The firm responds to positive
3More precisely, this will be valid as long as the price elasticity of demand is greater than 1. This will be relevant for
our empirical exercises below since our plant-level datasets contain information on sales revenue rather than quantity
sold.
4This property is implicit in all trade models with constant marginal cost including Krugman (1979), Krugman
(1980), and Melitz (2003), and explicitly assumed in structural applications such as Das et al. (2007) and Aw et al.
(2011)).
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export demand shocks by raising export sales because of higher marginal revenue relative to the
current marginal cost level in the export market. However, as the firm produces more to meet
the increased export sales, it incurs an increase in marginal cost due to the nature of increasing
marginal cost. This means that, for unchanged domestic market conditions, the firm would incur
losses by keeping domestic sales at Q∗D, since marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue at this point
in domestic market. The firm’s optimal response is then to decrease domestic sales to recover the
optimality condition in the domestic market. As a result, in the new equilibrium, the firm has higher
export sales, lower domestic sales, and higher marginal cost than before (i.e., Q∗∗F > Q
∗
F ,Q
∗∗
D < Q
∗
D,
and Q∗∗ > Q∗). Therefore, increasing marginal cost technology predicts that firm-level export and
domestic sales would respond to export demand shocks in opposing ways.
Infinite marginal cost (Capacity constraints) In Figure 3, we propose a special case of
increasing marginal cost technology, namely, infinite marginal cost. This can be understood as a
combination of the two earlier cases in that a firm operates normally with constant marginal cost
technology, but faces capacity constraints at a certain level of production beyond which production
becomes infeasible. We present this special case here because our empirical section below suggests
this most closely reflects patterns observed in the data.
Marginal cost is constant up to the output level Q∗, and it jumps to an infinite level beyond
this point, implying that the firm’s production capacity is such that the firm’s maximum feasible
output level is Q∗. Depending on market conditions, such a capacity constraint may or may not be
binding. A firm without any capacity constraint would find it optimal to produce Q′D and Q
′
F in the
domestic and the export markets, respectively, as shown in the constant marginal cost case earlier.
However, if the sum of these output levels exceeds the maximum capacity (e.g., Q′D+ Q
′
F > Q
∗),
the capacity constraint is binding, and the firm cannot attain the first-best outcome.
Instead, the firm needs to find sub-optimal points, Q∗D and Q
∗
F , which satisfy (i) MRD(Q
∗
D) =
MRF(Q∗F) > MC
∗ and (ii) Q∗ = Q∗D + Q
∗
F . We focus on this latter case with the binding capacity
constraint since the non-binding case is equivalent to the earlier constant marginal cost case. Now,
suppose that there occurs a positive export demand shock as before. As the firm decides to export
more in response to positive demand shocks abroad, the capacity constraint forces the firm to face a
trade-off between export and domestic sales, to keep total output at the maximum feasible level, Q∗.
Furthermore, the new equilibrium needs to satisfy the sub-optimality condition at which marginal
revenue from each market is equalized but exceeds the level of marginal cost (i.e., MRD(Q∗∗D ) =
MRF(Q∗∗F ) > MC
∗). Consequently, the new equilibrium features an increase in export sales and
a decrease in domestic sales with total output unchanged (i.e., Q∗∗F > Q
∗
F ,Q
∗∗
D < Q
∗
D, and Q
∗∗
D +
Q∗∗F = Q
∗). As was true with the more general case above, we conclude that the presence of
capacity constraints, unlike constant marginal cost, leads to a negative correlation between export
and domestic sales at the firm-level in response to market-specific demand shocks.
Sources of export-domestic sales trade-offs The most common rationale for increasing
marginal cost is the presence of fixed factors in production. For example, when a firm cannot
freely change the capital stock in the short run, the usual Cobb-Douglas production technology
leads to an increasing marginal cost (e.g., as modeled in Blum et al. (2011)). Even when factors
are flexible to adjust, still it is often increasingly costly as exemplified by overtime pay for labor.
More generally, we can think of various types of capacity constraints, which may be either
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physical or financial in nature. Any incumbent production line or plant itself has maximum capac-
ity it can produce, and since it takes time to expand the production facility, it is natural to expect
a firm to face a physical capacity constraint. In addition, financial institutions often set a line of
credit to each borrower, beyond which a borrower has to pay a prohibitive premium. Existing col-
lateral value or credit history may also act as a natural borrowing limit for each firm, which will in
turn limit the maximum feasible production level.5
An alternative source of capacity constraints comes from managerial ability constraints, often
referred to as a span of control problem a la Lucas (1978). Simply put, an entrepreneur’s manage-
rial skill exhibits decreasing returns to scale of the whole operation such that as the entrepreneur
devotes her time and efforts in expanding export markets, the firm would start losing its domes-
tic market share because she cannot spend as much time and effort on the domestic operation as
before, and vice versa.
So far, we have proceeded as if the patterns of correlation between domestic and export sales
growth are sufficient to verify the characteristics of marginal cost technology. The reality is more
complicated because, unlike our simple comparative statics analysis, domestic demand shocks may
arrive simultaneously with export demand shocks. To the extent that domestic demand shocks are
negatively correlated with export demand shocks, negative trade-offs between export and domestic
sales may arise even with constant marginal cost curve. In other words, if foreign and domestic de-
mand shocks are negatively correlated, it would bias the data towards our interpretation incorrectly.
Although literature on business cycle co-movement suggests this is unlikely, it is also not entirely
implausible.6 On the other hand, if they are positively correlated, it would bias the results against
finding negative trade-offs. In the empirical section below, we will present systemic evidence that
our findings are not simply driven by such negatively correlated demand shocks.
Although our theory holds most tightly when a firm produces and sells an identical product for
two segmented markets (i.e., domestic and export markets), it is valid in more general cases as well.
For example, multi-products firms even with a dedicated export market product line7 will face such
trade-offs by reallocating resources when they face capacity constraints. However, export-domestic
sales trade-offs may occur in multi-products firms not necessarily due to increasing marginal cost
but rather as a result of extensive margin adjustments (Bernard et al. (2010)).
Exchange rate movements would work against finding evidence for export-domestic sales
trade-offs. In the case of producer currency pricing, effective marginal costs for exporting should
be multiplied by the exchange rate. Then, currency depreciation will lower effective marginal costs
for exporting, leading to increases in exporting. At the same time, it will make imported goods
relatively expensive to domestic goods, shifting up the domestic demand curve and hence gen-
erating higher domestic sales. In the case of local currency pricing, export sales may change in
domestic currency unit via valuation effect, but since domestic sales will not respond to exchange
rate movements, this would tend to generate no relationship between domestic and export sales.
Lastly, it is important to note that firm productivity evolves over time. In fact, productivity
growth, negative or positive, would affect export and domestic sales in the same direction. Even
with increasing marginal cost, if a firm’s productivity improves, the marginal cost curve would
5It is worth noting that increasing fixed costs of reaching new (foreign) customers as in Arkolakis (2010) will
generate export-domestic sales trade-offs only when firms face financial constraints.
6Bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization may also generate such patterns, affecting domestic and export sales
in opposing ways, which is why we take care to control for industry-year shocks in our empirical specifications below.
7A good example is the VW plant in Mexico (Verhoogen (2008)).
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shift right in Figure 2, and the relevant marginal cost level goes down in Figure 2, possibly leading
to increases in both domestic and export sales in response to positive export demand shocks. This
force would work against finding evidence for export-domestic sales trade-offs.8
Aggregate implication The presence of increasing marginal cost is a firm-level micro phe-
nomenon, and it will have direct impacts on the firm-level export-domestic sales relationship. Once
aggregated, however, it also has an important macroeconomic implication. Since external demand
shocks induce adverse movements in domestic sales for exporters with increasing marginal cost,
aggregate output responses to external demand shocks will depend critically on the share of firms
with increasing marginal cost, as well as the degree of these costs, in the economy. For exam-
ple, total output in the economy populated primarily by constant marginal cost exporters becomes
very sensitive to external demand shocks, whereas an economy with mostly increasing marginal
cost exporters reduces output volatility in response to external demand shocks due to offsetting
movements in domestic sales.
Furthermore, when increasing marginal cost takes the particular form of capacity constraints,
as described in Figure 3, a direct consequence is that the price charged by such constrained firms
is higher than the optimal price that would have been charged in the absence of any constraints.
The wedge between actual and optimal prices can then be used to measure welfare losses caused
by capacity constraints. Our structural section will quantify both of these implications.
3 Data
The primary data is drawn from a well-used plant-level dataset collected by the Indonesia
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).9 The survey includes all medium and large manufacturing
plants with more than 20 employees starting from 1975. However, information on exporting was
not included in the questionnaire until 1990. We choose to start our analysis in 1990 for this reason,
leaving us with a seven-year panel.10
The Indonesian dataset is quite rich, with information on sector of main product, type of own-
ership, output, exports, assets, disaggregated inputs (including energy, raw materials, and labor),
and a variety of other measures that give a complete portrait of firm boundaries, production and
sales decisions.11 For our structural estimation, we will focus on the largest exporting industry,
8When using measures of productivity in the analysis, caution is required. Failing to include productivity will
result in a typical omitted variables problem, and in this context, bias upwards our estimates on export sales. However,
there is some concern about the reliability of the productivity measure since it is constructed based on total revenues,
which is used to construct our dependent variable (domestic sales). We take a conservative approach to this problem
by omitting productivity growth in most specifications, knowing that this is likely to work against finding evidence of
increasing marginal cost. In robustness checks, including productivity strengthens our findings as expected.
9Other studies that employed the same dataset include Blalock and Gertler (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008),
Rodrigue (2012), Mobarak and Purbasari (2006), Amiti and Konings (2007), and Sethupathy (2008) among others.
10Concerns over the reliability of survey reporting during the East Asian financial crisis limits the usable data to the
period between 1990 and 1996.
11Specifically, the Indonesian dataset records export sales as the percentage of total output. Instead of taking the
remaining output, (total output-export), as domestic sales, we consider inventory adjustments by subtracting changes
in inventory holdings from the remainder, (total output-export).
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manufacturing of wood, and wood and cork products (ISIC 331).12
The Annual Manufacturing Survey (SI) is designed to record all registered manufacturing
plants. The BPS submits a questionnaire each year, and when the questionnaires are not returned,
field agents visit the plant to ensure compliance or verify the plant is no longer in operation. The
survey is conducted at the plant-level. An additional survey is sent to the head office of each multi-
plant firm. Our data does not allow us to distinguish between single and multi-plant firms. The
BPS suggests that about 5% of plants are part of a multi-plant firm. For the rest of the paper, we
will use plant and firm interchangeably. Government laws require that the data collected will only
be used for statistical purposes and will not be disclosed to tax authorities (for further details, see
Blalock and Gertler (2004)). This suggests the financial data is reasonably well reported. Using
an industry-level wholesale price index published by the BPS, we deflate our measures of sales,
materials, and capital used in the analysis, which effectively removes industry-level inflationary
trends. Admittedly, this will not be able to remove firm-level prices, and thus we do not interpret
deflated sales as quantities sold.13
The Indonesian dataset is particularly useful for our purposes because it contains information
on both physical and financial capacity constraints, allowing us to disentangle these two possible
sources of increasing marginal cost. The questionnaire asks specifically about capacity utilization,
which forms the basis of our measure of physical capacity constraints. Our primary measure of
physical capacity constraints is 100% capacity utilization, which maps most closely to the infinite
marginal cost case in our theoretical model. Alternative cut-off values of capacity constrained firms
are used for robustness checks.
We also construct a measure of financial constraints based on financial information of the firm.
Specifically, our measure of financial distress uses the ratio of a firm’s cash flow to assets, where
financially constrained firms are defined as the bottom 50% of firms ranked by this measure. This
measure of financial distress is one of the most widely-used proxies for financial constraints in
the corporate finance literature (Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Whited and Wu (2006); Lin et al.
(2011)).
We start our analysis by considering the entire sample of firms over the seven-year panel.
This dataset includes a little under 125,000 observations, including 32,388 unique plants. Our
primary analysis will focus on firm-level yearly growth in domestic sales and multiple measures
of export status, which restricts our sample to just over 81,000 observations of firms that appear
in the dataset in consecutive years (22,326 unique plants). For reasons that we discuss below, we
will be particularly interested in a panel of continuing exports. When we restrict our sample to just
continuing exporters, we are left with 3,248 plants that are observed to export in consecutive years,
12This industry can be considered highly differentiated according to Broda and Weinstein (2006) with demand
elasticity around 2 (SITC Rev3. code 244-248).
13This gives rise to potential biases in productivity estimates. As De Loecker (2011) pointed out, however, pro-
ductivity growth measures will not be biased under reasonable conditions. This is one reason why we use a growth
regression analysis below, instead of a level regression, and include measures of productivity growth in a series of
robustness checks. The other reason is due to the fact that our export sales information comes from the ”percentage of
total outputs” that is exported. To the extent that the information is subject to reporting errors, it is possible that such
reporting errors generate a systemic negative correlation between domestic and export sales. If we believe reporting
errors are persistent over time at the firm-level, growth measures will not be affected by such reporting errors (see
Vannoorenberghe (2012), for example). However unlikely it may be that systematic reporting errors drive our Indone-
sian results, when we employ Chilean data, where sales in domestic and foreign markets are directly observable, we
eliminate this concern altogether.
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giving us 8,627 observations.
Table 1 provides a brief description of the sample, broken down by export classification. The
patterns are consistent with previous studies in that exporters are bigger (in terms of production and
sales) than non-exporters, and that continuing exporters are even bigger than occasional exporters.
Focusing just on firms that are physically constrained (Table 2), we see that exporters are
more likely to be physically constrained than non-exporters. About ten percent of all exporters
are classified as physically constrained. This is true for the subset of continuing exporters as
well as starting firms. Stoppers and non-exporters show lower occurrences of physical capacity
constraints. Physically constrained exporters tend to have higher export sales and lower domestic
sales than their unconstrained counterparts. This raises the question that there may be a relationship
between physical capacity constraints and sales decisions across markets, which we will explore
in detail in the reduced form approach.
As described above, our measure of financially constrained firms is based on a financial dis-
tress measure of cash flow to assets ratio. By construction, firms below the median in terms of this
ratio are considered constrained. From Table 3, one can see that exporting firms that are classified
as financially constrained tend to sell less in both domestic and foreign markets relative to uncon-
strained exporters. Similar patterns hold for starters and continuing exporters who are financially
constrained.
Although the Indonesian dataset is quite rich in terms of firm characteristics, there is a con-
cern that because of the way that exports are reported in the survey, reporting errors might lead
us to make spurious conclusions about the relationship between export sales and domestic sales.
Furthermore, since our underlying economic mechanism of capacity constraints should be quite
general, we should find firm-level evidence in any country where physical and financial constraints
are likely to be significant. While we think this will be true of most countries, it is likely to be a
particular problem for developing countries that often have limited or informal financial markets.
To that end, we attempt to confirm our results using data from Chile.
Our complementary analysis uses a panel dataset of Chilean firms from 1995-2006. This data
includes all manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees. The dataset has been used in a
number of studies, and a thorough description of the data can be found in Blum et al. (2011).14
For our purposes, the definitions of variables are essentially the same as with the Indonesian data,
except for two variables of interest.
First, export sales is an actual reported value in the survey, unlike the Indonesian reported
measure of percentage of total sales exported. Reporting errors in percent of total sales exported
could lead to a spurious conclusion that export sales and domestic sales are negatively correlated
even when they are not (see footnote 11 above). By using Chilean data, which reports export and
domestic sales separately, we can address this concern. We deflate all measures of sales, materials,
and capital used in the analysis with an industry-level price index.15
While the Chilean data provides an improvement in the data in terms of independent mea-
surement of export and domestic sales, the survey does not include a direct measure of capacity
utilization. This drawback leads us to prefer the Indonesian data for our primary analysis. The
14In addition to Blum et al., this dataset has been used widely in empirical studies of firm behavior, starting with Liu
(1993) and Pavcnik (2002), with more recent contributions by Kohn et al. (2012) and Kasahara and Lapham (2012),
among others.
15The industry-level price index was provided by Ana Margarida Fernandes, and has been used previously in
Almeida and Fernandes (2013).
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Chilean data, while limited, does increase our confidence in the robustness of our results if the
general patterns found in each country are the same. When we consider physical capacity con-
straints in Chile, we classify firms as physically constrained using an alternative proxy measure.
Firms that report an increase in machinery and equipment capital are classified as unconstrained,
while all other firms are classified as constrained. The idea is that those firms that have expanded
physical capacity, which is proxied by machinery and equipment capital, are less likely to face
physical constraints, and the opposite will be true for other firms that have contracted physical
capacity.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for our Chilean data. The patterns observed for Chilean
firms are qualitatively similar to those in Indonesia, with exporters being bigger than non-exporters,
and continuing exporters being even bigger than starters. Table 5 and Table 6 show summary
statistics for physically constrained firms and financially constrained firms. The patterns are once
again similar to those observed in Indonesia.
4 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section, we employ a reduced form approach to identify the presence of increasing
marginal cost as well as its sources. Specifically, we explore the relationship between firm-level
export and domestic sales growth. Our theoretical discussion in Section 2 suggests that we should
observe no clear relationship between changes in export and domestic sales when firms have con-
stant marginal cost technology, whereas the presence of increasing marginal cost technology would
result in a negative correlation between them.
4.1 Plant-level Evidence from Indonesia
Focusing on evidence from Indonesia first, let’s consider some simple descriptive statistics of
the relationship between export sales and domestic sales. If the standard view of constant marginal
cost technology is valid, there should not be any relationship between export sales and domestic
sales in the data. We start by considering a sample of all Indonesian firms that are active in two
consecutive periods. This gives us a sample with 81,119 observations.
In Table 7, firms are classified by export switching status.16 From Column (1), we can see
that relative to continuing exporters and non-exporters, starters have lower domestic sales growth
rates, while stoppers have higher domestic sales growth rates. The difference is highly significant
statistically, and economically intriguing since this is suggestive of an underlying trade-off between
serving the export market and serving the domestic market, which is not predicted by the standard
constant marginal cost assumption typical of most firm-level approaches.
The results presented in Table 7 are quite robust. When we include sector-year fixed effects
(3-digit ISIC level), the estimated magnitudes are unaffected (column 2). Inclusion of sector-year
fixed effects control for economic policies that might differ across sectors over time, for example
changes in tariffs. Furthermore, accounting for firm fixed effects (column 3) has little impact on the
estimated relationship between starting or stopping exporting and the domestic sales growth rate,
16We classify a firm-year observation as either a starter, stopper, or continuer. A firm that begins exporting in a
given year is classified as a starter, while a firm that stops exporting in a given year is classified as a stopper. We
classify all other firms, both continuing exporters and continuing non-exporters, as continuers.
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supporting the view that this is indeed within-firm variation. In column 4, both sector-year and
firm fixed effects are included with no noticeable differences. As with all specifications, standard
errors are clustered at the sector-year level to account for correlated industry-year shocks.
To consider the robustness of this result, measures of productivity are included in Table 8.
There is a concern that productivity growth within a firm may be driving correlations in the data
between export sales and domestic sales, since firms that are becoming more productive are likely
to be expanding in both markets simultaneously. Improvements in productivity within the firm
would drive down the marginal cost curve, which in turn would increase the optimal output in both
the domestic and foreign markets. All else equal, this would tend to create a positive correlation
in the data between export status and domestic sales growth rate, although it should be noted that
this is not observed in the data presented in Table 7.
Nonetheless, excluding productivity growth amounts to a typical omitted variables problem.
It is important to make sure that unobserved variables are not driving the results, and firm-level
productivity growth could be significant in terms of the estimated magnitudes. In columns (1)-(3)
of Table 8, labor productivity growth is included in the analysis. As predicted, labor productivity
growth shows up as significant with a positive impact on domestic sales growth. The coefficients
on the starter and stopper indicators were biased upward marginally in the original specification.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 include two alternative measures of productivity growth, a
standard TFP growth measure and an additional measure of productivity growth based on the work
of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).17 The inclusion of either measure tells the same story: even after
accounting for productivity growth, there is strong evidence to support the view that export status
is negatively correlated with domestic sales growth, suggesting that firms are facing trade-offs over
sales to domestic and foreign markets. This implication is inconsistent with the standard theory
that implicitly views markets as independent, typically through an explicit assumption of constant
marginal cost technology.
One particular mechanism that can generate such trade-offs would be increasing marginal cost
technology. To explore the role increasing marginal cost plays in this trade-off, we consider specific
firm-level sources that could give rise to increasing marginal cost, namely physical and financial
capacity constraints.
Our preferred strategy to verify specific sources of increasing marginal cost is to control for
capacity constraints explicitly in addition to the analysis presented above. The idea is that if it is
increasing marginal costs that are driving the observed negative correlation between export status
and domestic sales growth, it is to be expected that this pattern will be stronger for firms that are ca-
pacity constrained since these firms are facing steeper costs associated with expanding production.
The primary specification is:
∆ln(domestic sales)ist = α + starterist + stopperist + β1(capacity constraint)ist +
β2[(starter)ist ∗ (capacity constraint)ist] + γ(controlsist) + FEst +
FEi + ist
17Specifically, TFP is estimated in two ways. First, regress log (value added) on log (capital) and log (labor) for each
industry in year t, and estimate the industry-year level capital and labor share. Then, TFP is calculated as the firm-level
residual, which can be interpreted as the deviation from industry-year mean. Second, we follow the methodology of
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with raw material and labor as freely varying inputs, and electricity and fuels usage as
well as capital as proxies for productivity.
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for firm i in industry s in year t, where FE stands for fixed effects. The capacity constraint is
a dummy variable with 1 for constrained firms and 0 otherwise. Our main focus will be on the
coefficient of the interaction term, β2. β2 < 0 implies that constrained firms show a stronger
negative correlation between export status and domestic sales growth, supporting the increasing
marginal cost story.
The analysis will be particularly interested in the interaction effects between starting exporting
and different types of capacity constraints. The idea here is that firms that are beginning to export
are facing critical decisions about allocating sales across markets, and this trade-off between sales
will be particularly acute for firms that are facing physical and financial capacity constraints.18
The analysis also includes indicator functions for intensive exporters, that is, firms that export over
50% of their total output in a given year. Indonesia is populated by a large number of intensive
exporters, which we need to account for in the analysis.19 Including an indicator for intensive
exporters (as well as lagged intensive exports) pulls out a level effect of these specialized exporters
and allows us to focus on the role of capacity constraints.
Turning to the results in Table 9, for reference column (1) reproduces the within-firm result
from Table 7, controlling for sector-year fixed effects. Column (2) includes indicator functions
for intensive exporters in both periods associated with the observation (since we are looking at
log changes in domestic sales). We see that being an intensive exporter has a significant effect on
domestic sales, and we can infer from the results that starting (stopping) as an intensive exporter
reduces (increases) domestic sales growth significantly. Further, being an intensive exporter in
both periods of the observation would have no effect on domestic sales growth, as the coefficients
on lag and current intensive exporters are of similar magnitude but opposite sign. We should note
that a standard model with constant marginal cost does not predict these pattern.
In column (3), we consider the role of physical capacity constraints and exporting. An indica-
tor for physical capacity constraints takes on the value of 1 when capacity utilization is reported
as 100% by the firm, and 0 otherwise.20 The interaction term between starting exporting and be-
ing physically constrained is negative and statistically significant. This implies that physically
constrained firms that start exporting have lower domestic sales growth than their unconstrained
counterparts, which supports the view that physical capacity constraints are giving rise to increas-
ing marginal cost.
In column (4), we consider the role of financial constraints separately. While being financially
constrained has an overall negative effect on domestic sales growth, there is no clear effect of
financial distress for starters. Column (5) includes both financial and physical constraints simul-
taneously, with similar estimated results. Column (6) includes labor productivity growth as an
additional robustness check, but does not change the basic findings.
18The mechanisms for firms that are stopping exporting is less clear since the decision to stop exporting altogether
may be correlated with physical and financial capacity constraints, making separate identification difficult. It is proba-
ble that some firms that stopped exporting should have been classified as constrained, but since they stopped exporting,
they do not show up in the data as capacity constrained. This suggests that our measurement of constrained and un-
constrained stoppers mixes actual firm types, thus confounding inference about the role of capacity constraints for
stoppers. Firms that are starting exporting are the most clear test of the relevance of capacity constraints, and hence
sources of increasing marginal cost.
19The importance of controlling for intensive exporters will become clear in the next section when we explore
aggregate difference between Indonesian and Chilean firms.
20Soderbery (2011) also employs a similar capacity utilization variable from Thai data as a proxy for physical
capacity constraints.
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Overall, Table 9 provides some evidence that the existence of capacity constraints is giving rise
to an economic trade-off between domestic and export sales. Physical constraints clearly matter for
firms that are beginning to export, and the existence of such capacity constraints lowers domestic
sales growth relative to unconstrained starters.
The results for financial capacity constraints appear to suggest that financial constraints are not
a significant factor for firms that are starting to export. Another possibility might be that financial
constraints do matter, but our measure of financial distress is not accurately measuring financial
constraints. While we acknowledge these alternative stories, we suspect that the real story is that
exporting requires substantial sunk costs, which can be onerous even for firms in good financial
health. This would tend to generate no significant difference in domestic sales growth between
starters classified as financially constrained and unconstrained.
The existence and importance of sunk costs of entry into foreign markets has been well docu-
mented and it is likely disguising the role of financial capacity constraints for firms that are starting
to export. In order to separate out such effects of sunk costs, we focus on a subset of firms that
have already paid the sunk cost of entry. This approach fits our primary interest in understanding
the role that marginal cost plays in the decision to allocate sales between foreign and domestic
markets.
To this end, to better evaluate the role of capacity constraints, we focus on a subset of firms that
have already paid the sunk cost of entry. Our panel of continuing exporters includes all firms that
are observed to export in consecutive periods. This allows us to sidestep issues of financing sunk
costs, and focus on firms for whom the main challenge will be financing working capital rather
than sunk costs of market entry.
Table 10 provides a first glance at the relationship between export sales growth and domestic
sales growth. Since we are restricting our sample to a panel of continuing exporters, we are able
to observe variation in domestic and export sales growth simultaneously, instead of just indicators
for changes in export status.
The same basic patterns emerge, however. Column (1) shows no correlation between export
sales and domestic sales, which could be interpreted as support for the constant marginal cost
story. The inclusion of sector-year fixed effects in column (2) similarly finds no relation between
domestic and export sales growth. Since increasing marginal cost is fundamentally a within-firm
story, we should include firm fixed effects in the analysis, which is done in column (3). Export
sales growth is now negative and strongly significant, and this effect is robust to the inclusion of
sector-year fixed effects (column 4).
Our first result for continuing exporters is that there is a significant negative relationship be-
tween export sales growth and domestic sales growth for individual firms. This is inconsistent with
the standard story of independent markets.
As was noted above, simple correlations in the data may not tell the whole story. In particular,
omitted variables such as productivity might matter, though in the case of productivity growth,
omission should bias upward the estimated coefficients of export sales growth. To account for
this possibility, Table 11 includes multiple measures of productivity growth (measures based on
labor productivity, simple TFP growth, and a measure based on Levisohn-Petrin). The inclusion of
productivity does not alter the basic story that export sales and domestic sales are negatively corre-
lated for a firm, though the omission of productivity was biasing upward the estimated coefficient
on export sales growth by over 50%.
To truly uncover the role of capacity constraints, we consider the following preferred specifi-
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cation:
∆ ln(domestic sales)ist = α + β1∆ ln(export)ist + β2(capacity constraint)ist
+ β3∆ ln(export)ist ∗ (capacity constraint)ist
+ β4∆ ln(productivity)ist + FEst + FEi + εist
for firm i in industry s in year t, where FE stands for fixed effects. The capacity constraint is
a dummy variable with 1 for constrained firms and 0 otherwise. Our main focus is again on
the coefficient of the interaction term, β3. β3 < 0 implies that constrained firms show a stronger
negative correlation between export and domestic sales growth, supporting the increasing marginal
cost story.
Results are reported in Table 12 . Column (1) restates the initial finding of a negative corre-
lation between export sales and domestic sales growth within the firm for reference. Column (2)
investigates the impact of physical capacity constraints. The interaction term between exporting
and capacity constraints is negative and statistically significant. Export growth continues to be
negative and statistically significant as well, suggesting that physical capacity constraints can ex-
plain part but not all of the negative relationship between export sales growth and domestic sales
growth.
Column (3) considers financial constraints separately. For the panel on continuing exporters,
the difference in results compared to the entire sample is illuminating. First, the interaction term
between financial capacity constraints and export sales growth is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that financially distressed exporters have lower domestic sales growth than
unconstrained exporters. This is different from the entire sample of firms, and we believe this
difference is attributable to the challenge of financing large sunk costs.
A second intriguing difference is that export growth is no longer separately significant (and in
fact the point estimate is positive). The interpretation is that the negative correlation we observed
in the data is being driven by firms that are capacity constrained, especially those firms that are
financially distressed.
Column (4) includes both physical and financial capacity constraints. Both interaction terms
are negative and statistically significant. The point estimate on export growth is positive and in-
significant. Taken together, the results presented in column (4) strongly suggest that for a subset of
firms that are capacity constrained, either physical or financial, there is an economically significant
negative relationship between export sales growth and domestic sales growth.
The size of the reported coefficients implies that a physically constrained exporter experiences
a .27 decrease in domestic sales for every 1 percent increase in export sales compared to an un-
constrained exporter. If the exporter is both physically and financially constrained, the decrease
in domestic sales growth is -.49 (.27+.22) percent for every one percent increase in export sales
growth. For unconstrained firms, there is no apparent relationship between export and domestic
sales growth.
Columns (5) through (7) show the result is robust to the inclusion of productivity measures,
although the estimated impact of financial distress on exporters is reduced somewhat.
Table 12 provides strong evidence that export sales and domestic sales growth are negatively
related for individual firms, and this relationship is particularly pronounced for firms that are facing
physical and financial constraints. In fact, once you account for capacity constraints, there is no
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noticeable relationship between export sales and domestic sales growth. We take this as evidence
that capacity constrained firms are numerous and economically significant, and this calls into ques-
tion the standard assumption of constant marginal cost. One of the implications of dropping this
standard assumption is that markets are not independent, and shocks in foreign markets can impact
firm behavior in the domestic market.
While Table 12 provides evidence about the nature of capacity constraints and the interrelation
of foreign and domestic sales, we consider a number of robustness checks to confirm the findings.
To confirm the robustness of our measures of capacity constraints, we consider alternative
definitions. First, we relax the physical capacity constraint by lowering the threshold associated
with being categorized as physically constrained from 100%, to 70% of capacity utilization. This
will tend to classify more firms that did not face physical capacity constraints as constrained,
which would reduce the estimated impact of being constrained. On the other hand, since there
are certainly some firms that were physically constrained even though they did not report a 100%
capacity utilization, the overall effect on misclassification may not be too large.
In column (1) of Table 13, the alternative measure of physical capacity constraints shows a
similar interaction effect as in Table 12, though slightly smaller as would be expected if more
unconstrained firms were being reclassified as constrained. In column (2), the alternative measure
of physical capacity constraints is included along with the original measure of financial distress.
Once again, both interaction terms are significant, and the estimated impact for the interaction of
export sales growth and physical constraints is smaller. Alternative measures of physical capacity
constraints do not alter the underlying story.
As an alternative measure of financial distress, only firms in the bottom 10% in terms of ranking
by cash flow to asset ratio are categorized as financially distressed. This effectively tightens up the
measure of financial constraints, which means that more firms that are financially distressed are
likely to be classified as unconstrained financially. Empirically, this should lower the estimated
impact of the interaction effect since the unconstrained group now includes more constrained firms.
Column (3) of Table 13 looks at the alternative measure of financial capacity constraints in
isolation and again finds a statistically significant and negative interaction effect. Column (4)
includes the original measure of physical constraints along with the alternative measure of financial
constraints. Both interaction effects are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the
results are not being driven by mismeasurement of firm-level capacity constraints.
Column (5) uses both alternative measures of capacity constraints. The interaction effects
are negative and statistically significant. The only real difference is that the estimated impact of
capacity constraints is about a third smaller, which is consistent with the idea that the alternative
measures are now classifying groups with more within-group variation and less between-group
variation. The last three columns of Table 13 include three different measures of productivity
growth, which attest to the robustness of the underlying economic mechanism.
In sum, we have shown that there exists a negative relationship between domestic sales growth
and export sales growth as well as export status from Indonesian plant-level data. Furthermore,
our results show that such patterns are particularly acute for capacity constrained firms, be it either
financially or physically. We take the results as strong evidence for the presence of increasing
marginal cost, driven by financial and physical capacity constraints.
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4.2 Plant-level Evidence From Chile
This section addresses two significant concerns. The first is that Indonesian firms may not be
sufficiently similar to firms in other countries, and therefore our results may not be generalizable.
In particular, we would like to have confidence in our results for firm-level responses in markets
where physical and financial constraints are likely to be acute. While this is probably true even in
developed markets, we think it is particularly relevant for firms in developing countries. To that
end, we explore and confirm the basic results presented above using Chilean plant-level data.
A second important concern that relates to our use of the Indonesian data, above and beyond
issues of generalizability, is that our key variables of interest (export and domestic sales) are con-
structed using a single question on the underlying survey. Firms are asked to report the percentage
of total output exported, from which export and domestic sales are inferred. The concern here
is that errors in reporting, including measurement error, will tend to show up mechanically as a
negative relationship between export sales and domestic sales.
Although we have already provided extensive systemic evidence suggesting that the results are
not simply driven by measurement error, it is nonetheless reassuring to confirm our findings using
data free from such issues. Chilean data reports domestic sales and export sales separately. The
evidence presented below therefore allows us to rule out measurement error definitively, and pro-
vides support that the mechanism we have identified - physical and financial capacity constraints
at the firm-level - is more generally important in developing country contexts.
Focusing first on simple descriptive statistics of the data, Table 14 compares mean and me-
dian domestic sales growth by export status for both Indonesia and Chile. One should note that in
both countries firms that start exporting experience slower domestic sales growth rates compared
to the other three categories (stoppers, continuing exports and continuing non-exporters). Further-
more, mean and median domestic sales growth rates are actually negative for starters, compared
to continuing non-exporters who experience positive domestic sales growth on average. This is
consistent with the idea that starting exporters are constrained and are foregoing domestic sales in
the pursuit of international sales.21
At the other end of the spectrum, firms classified as stoppers (i.e. those that switch from export-
ing to not exporting) experience the largest growth in domestic sales, higher than even continuing
exporters, which typically perform the ”best” on standard measures of firm performance. This
pattern is consistent with the pattern observed for Indonesian stoppers as well. For both countries,
the ranking of firms by exports status and domestic sales growth is the same: stoppers, continuing
exporters, continuing non-exporters, and finally starters.
While these are important similarities in the data, one glaring difference between Chilean and
Indonesian firms is that the mean and median magnitudes are much greater for Indonesian starters
and stoppers. Although it is possible that this observation might be due to reporting errors in
Indonesian export sales, Table 15 shows that it is mostly driven by the composition of intensive
switchers. We define ”intensive starters” to be firms that start exporting in a given year and are
exporting more than 50% of their total output. Similarly, ”intensive stoppers” are defined to be
firms that were exporting more than 50% of their output in the previous year, and have stopped
exporting in the current year. We can see from Table 15 that a larger share of intensive switchers
among Indonesian firms drives the stark differences observed in the aggregate.
21Kohn et al. (2012) and an earlier version of Blum et al. (2011) report similar patterns using Chilean data.
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Table 15 makes two important points. First, the magnitudes found Indonesia are larger than in
Chile, but not because of the nature of data reporting. Rather, Indonesia and Chile have similar
magnitudes, once ”intensive switchers” are accounted for. Indonesia simply has disproportionately
more intensive starters and intensive stoppers.
Second, classifying firms by the relative size of starting and stopping provides new evidence
that firms are capacity constrained, since the standard unconstrained story would predict there
should be no difference in behavior for these intensive starters and stoppers. For unconstrained
firms, intensive movements in to or out of the export market would have no impact on domestic
sales since output could adjust to offset foreign sales changes. This is further evidence that there
are significant short-run capacity constraints, which manifests itself through domestic market fluc-
tuations. 22
The descriptive analysis above is suggestive that the negative correlation between domestic and
export sales for financially and physically constrained firms in Indonesia is in fact a more general
phenomenon. To consider this in more detail, we replicate the within-firm analysis for Chilean
firms, starting with a complete panel of firms before focusing on a panel of continuing exporters.
For comparative purposes, we add the corresponding column for Indonesia in the far right of each
table.
Starting with a simple fixed effects regression, Table 16 shows that starter and stopper indicators
are statistically significant and are the expected sign. Starters tend to be associated with declines in
domestic sales growth, while stoppers see significant increases in domestic sales growth relative to
non-switching firms. This effect is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects as well as sector-year
fixed effects. In column (5), labor productivity is included to confirm the result is not being driven
by omitting firm-level growth in productivity. This pattern is similar to that of Indonesia, though
quantitative differences arose due to the composition of intensive switchers as discussed above.
Table 17 considers the role of capacity constraints explicitly. Column (1) shows the base re-
lationship. In column (2), indicator functions for intensive (and lagged intensive) exporting are
included. Including these indicators lowers the estimated magnitude significantly, but does not
change the sign or statistical significance on either starter or stopper. Firms that start exporting see
significant declines in domestic sales growth, while firms that stop exporting experience significant
increases in domestic sales growth.
Moving on to measures of physical and financial capacity constraints, column (3) includes first
an indicator for physically constrained as well as an interaction term for physically constrained
and export status.23 The interaction term for physical capacity constraints and starting exporting
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the negative relationship between export
status and domestic sales growth in the Chilean data is also attributable to those firms that are
capacity constrained.
Column (4) looks at the independent effect of financial constraints, while column (5) includes
both physical and financial constraints. It should be noted that for these specifications, the interac-
22Comparing firms in these two countries therefore contributes additional support for the view that firms face ca-
pacity constraints - support that comes from trying to reconcile observed differences across countries. Cross-country
comparisons between firm behavior can produce interesting differences that invite greater scrutiny of the data in ways
that studying firms of one country in isolation cannot. Such comparisons have not typically been included in firm-level
studies, but should be included more regularly in future work.
23Due to limitations of the Chilean data, we construct an alternative proxy for physical capacity constraints than
was used with the Indonesian data. For details, refer to the data section above.
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tion effect is positive and statistically significant, which contradicts our previous results. Column
(6) shows, however, that the result for financial constraints is not robust, once productivity growth
is accounted for in the specification. The estimated impact on starter is essentially zero. The in-
teraction on physical and starter is negative and statistically significant, and the estimated impact
on the interaction of financial and starter is statistically insignificant. This suggests that omitting
productivity growth from the regression was biasing up the estimate of the interaction of financial
constraints and starting exporting.
Comparing the specification for Chile with that from Indonesia (reproduced in column (7)),
we see similar patterns between the two countries. We believe the same interpretation of that
result is appropriate here: sunk costs of exporting are large, even for firms that are not distressed
financially, and the existence of these sunk costs may be biasing the results. To get around the
issue of financing sunk costs, and more carefully consider our hypothesized role for firm-level
capacity constraints, we again consider a panel of continuing exporters, for whom financial health
concerns the ability to finance working capital, rather than pay sunk costs to exporting. The panel
of continuing exporters have already paid these sunk costs, which should no longer influence their
economic behavior regarding sales decisions in foreign and domestic markets. Narrowing the
focus to a panel of continuing exporters better illuminates the role of capacity constraints and
market interdependence.
As was done above with Indonesian firms, we first look at the relationship between export sales
growth and domestic sales growth in the raw data. As can be seen in Table 18, for the sample of
continuing exporters, there is a significant negative relationship between export sales growth and
domestic sales growth. The magnitudes are similar in Chile and Indonesia, suggesting the concern
over measurement of export sales is unwarranted.
Table 19 confirms that the negative correlation between foreign and domestic sales is systemat-
ically associated with firm-level capacity constraints. The relationship between export sales growth
and domestic sales growth is weakened when physical capacity constraints are included, and the
interaction term between export sales growth and physical capacity constraints is negative and
statistically significant (column 2).
Similar patterns emerge for financially constrained firms, which once again show stronger pat-
terns of market interdependence than unconstrained firms. Column (3) shows the effect of export
sales growth is again reduced, once financial capacity constraints are accounted for explicitly. Of
particular note is the negative and statistically significant interaction term between export sales and
financial constraints. Firms which are capacity constrained because of financial constraints tend to
experience slower export sales growth relative to those firms that are not financially constrained.
When both financial constraints and physical constraints are included, the observed negative
relationship between domestic and foreign sales disappears (column 4). That is, interdependence
of market sales is only observed among those firms that are capacity constrained, with the form
of capacity constraints being either physical or financial (or both). This continues to be true, even
after controlling for productivity growth (column 7).
The results presented in Table 19 are provocative. The effect identified earlier for Indonesian
firms is confirmed in the Chilean data. While the magnitudes of the impact are larger in Indonesia
than in Chile, for both sets of firms, the story is the same. Firms appear to face trade-offs between
selling in foreign markets and selling domestically, and these trade-offs are particularly acute for
those firms that face physical and financial capacity constraints.
In sum, we have shown that the underlying negative correlation between export sales growth
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(or export status) and domestic sales growth is robust to a variety of measures of productivity,
and it is stronger for financially or physically constrained firms. This reduces concerns that the
results are driven by a negative correlation between domestic and export demand, as it is hard to
explain why the negative correlation between domestic and export demand is stronger for capacity
constrained firms. Furthermore, our results show that unconstrained firms do not exhibit any such
negative correlation. Most importantly, we have shown that identical patterns are observed in two
different developing market contexts, Indonesia and Chile.
We take all these results as evidence for the presence of capacity constrained firms in the
economy. It has yet to be shown that the existence of such capacity constrained exporters is eco-
nomically important. We turn next to quantifying the effect of constrained firms in the aggregate.
5 Structural Form Approach
We develop a structural form analysis to quantify the aggregate implication of the presence of
increasing marginal cost firms in the economy. In addition to providing quantitative implications,
our contribution from this section includes a methodological one that identifies firm-level price and
quantity sold in each market separately.
Specifically, our estimation framework builds heavily on the static part of the innovative struc-
tural trade model in Aw et al. (2011). Based on our findings from the reduced form approach, we
modify their model by taking into account the presence of increasing marginal cost explicitly. We
categorize firms into two groups: capacity constrained and unconstrained. Capacity constrained
firms include those firms that used 100% of capacity or firms with a cash-flow/asset ratio below the
median. All other firms are classified as unconstrained firms. Further, we assume that constrained
firms face infinite marginal cost as described in Figure 3 in Section 2 at firm-specific capacity
constraint level, qtotit , which is assumed to be always binding. Consequently, we allow constrained
exporters to face inter-dependent markets (i.e., export-domestic sales trade-offs). Then, we exploit
optimality conditions for unconstrained exporters, and sub-optimality condition for constrained
exporters, which enables us to identify firm-level demand curve in each market, and hence firm-
level price and quantity in each market. Subsequent counterfactual exercises suggest that capacity
constraints play a substantial role in dampening aggregate output sensitivity to demand shocks.
For the following estimation procedure, we pick one industry with ISIC code 331(Manufacture
of wood and wood and cork products, except furniture), the largest exporting industry in Indonesia
by volume.
5.1 Structural Framework
We assume that domestic and export markets are segmented, each of which is governed by a
CES demand function. Specifically, domestic demand function faced by each firm i at time t is
given as:
qdit = Φ
d
t
(
pdit
)−σd ⇐⇒ pdit = (Φdt ) 1σd (qdit)− 1σd (1)
where σd is the elasticity of substitution in the domestic market. The aggregate demand level in the
domestic market at each time t, Φdt , determines the position of the demand curve common to every
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firm. For a set of firms without any capacity constraint (i.e., constant marginal cost), the optimal
price is simply the markup over its marginal cost:
p jit =
σ j
σ j − 1MCit (2)
for j = D for domestic goods and F for export goods. Therefore, the level of marginal cost
becomes the sole factor determining firm-specific domestic sales along the common demand curve
for this set of firms. Regarding the export demand curve, we allow idiosyncratic export demand
shifters24, zexit , on top of the common aggregate export demand level, Φ
ex
t , leading to firm specific
export demand curve given as:
qexit = Φ
ex
t z
ex
it
(
pexit
)−σex ⇐⇒ pexit = (Φext zexit ) 1σex (qexit )− 1σex (3)
and unconstrained firms achieve the optimal export sales with the optimal price given in equation
(2).
Following Aw et al. (2011), we assume that marginal cost is independent of total output level
(i.e., constant marginal cost), and is a function of the firm’s own capital level, kit, industry-wide
factor prices, wt, and its own unobservable productivity level, ωit:
ln (MCit) = β0 + βk ln (kit) + βw ln (wt) − ωit (4)
Since the optimal price is a markup over marginal cost for a set of unconstrained firms as shown
in equation (2), total variable cost, which is simply the marginal cost times the total output, is
expressed as:
TVCit = qditMCit + q
ex
it MCit =
σd − 1
σd
rdit +
σex − 1
σex
rexit (5)
for unconstrained firms, where rdit and r
ex
it are domestic sales revenue and export sales revenue,
respectively.
Also, the optimal pricing rule in (2) allows us to express the domestic revenue of unconstrained
firms as:
rdit = p
d
itq
d
it = Φ
d
t
(
σd
σd − 1MCit
)1−σd
(6)
and similarly for export sales of these firms as:
rexit = p
ex
it q
ex
it = Φ
ex
t z
ex
it
(
σex
σex − 1MCit
)1−σex
(7)
In fact, the optimal price in equation (2) is the outcome of the optimality condition that equates
marginal cost with marginal revenue. This means that unconstrained firms satisfy the optimality
condition in each market at the same time:
MRdit = MR
ex
it = MCit (8)
24Without this term, the model will predict a constant export-to-domestic sales ratio across firms, which is not
supported in the data.
21
Unlike unconstrained firms, however, capacity constrained firms cannot produce more than a
certain level of output, beyond which actual marginal cost becomes infinite. Under our assumption
that the capacity constraint is always binding, constrained firms cannot achieve the optimality
condition in (8), and instead operate at the sub-optimal point where the following condition holds:
MRdit = MR
ex
it > MCit (9)
Since equation (2) is not valid for constrained firms, equations (5), (6), and (7) will not hold for
constrained firms. In what follows, we first derive estimation procedures for unconstrained firms,
before turning to constrained firms.
5.2 Structural Estimation
Unconstrained exporters In order to take the theoretical framework from the previous sec-
tion to the data, we begin by estimating the elasticity of substitution in each market using equation
(5):
TVCit =
(
σd − 1
σd
)
rdit +
(
σex − 1
σex
)
rexit + eit (10)
Total variable cost on the left hand side of equation (10) comes from the data as the sum of interme-
diate input costs and total labor payment. Admittedly, parts of labor payment are associated with
fixed overhead costs, and therefore, it is at best a proxy for total variable cost with measurement
error eit. Domestic sales and export sales revenue on the right hand side are taken directly from the
data. Running a simple OLS regression gives coefficient estimates from which we can back out
elasticities σd and σex.
Next, we turn to the optimality condition that marginal revenue in each market is equalized.
Domestic sales revenue in equation (6) can be expressed alternatively as:
rdit = p
d
itq
d
it =
(
Φdt
) 1
σd
(
qdit
)σd−1
σd (11)
by converting price as a function of quantity as expressed in demand equation (1). We can write
export sales revenue in a similar way:
rexit = p
ex
it q
ex
it =
(
Φext z
ex
it
) 1
σex
(
qexit
)σex−1
σex (12)
and the optimality condition that equates marginal revenue across each market becomes:
MRdit
MRexit
=
(
σd−1
σd
) (
qdit
) −1
σd
(
Φdt
) 1
σd(
σex−1
σex
) (
qexit
) −1
σex (Φext ) 1σex (zexit ) 1σex = 1 (13)
Then, we replace the quantity of domestic sales as a function of domestic sales revenue and aggre-
gate demand from equation (11), and similarly for the quantity of export sales, to get:
MRdit
MRexit
=
(
σd−1
σd
) (
rdit
) −1
σd−1
(
Φdt
) 1
σd−1(
σex−1
σex
) (
rexit
) −1
σex−1 (Φext ) 1σex−1 (zexit ) 1σex−1 = 1 (14)
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As long as we have recovered firm-level export demand shifters zexit , taking domestic sales and ex-
port sales from the data, and using the estimated elasticities, this is essentially solving the equation
with unknown parameter Kt for each year t, where
Kt =
(
Φdt
) 1
σd−1(
Φext
) 1
σex−1
(15)
That is, the first part of the optimality condition (i.e., equalizing marginal revenue in each market)
pins down a quasi-ratio between aggregate demand in the domestic and export market. In order
to estimate firm-level export demand shifters zexit , we now exploit the second part of the optimality
condition (i.e., marginal revenue equals marginal cost) expressed in equation (6) and (7) with the
specific marginal cost structure given in equation (4).
Substituting equation (4) for marginal cost in equation (6) and (7), domestic sales in equation
(6) is rewritten in logs as:
ln
(
rdit
)
= (1 − σd) ln
(
σd
σd − 1
)
+ ln
(
Φdt
)
+ (1 − σd) (β0 + βk ln (kit) + βw ln (wt) − ωit)
Rearranging constant and time specific terms,
ln
(
rdit
)
= γd0 +
∑
γdt Dt + (1 − σd) (βk ln (kit) − ωit) (16)
with time dummy Dt.
A key issue in estimating equation (16) is that firm productivity ωit is not observable, and a
simple regression will yield biased estimates, particularly when productivity levels are correlated
with capital levels. In the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and
following Aw et al. (2011), we assume that the term composed of capital and productivity can be
proxied by a cubic function of capital, material costs, and fuels usage:
(1 − σd) (βk ln (kit) − ωit) = h (kit,mit, nit) + vit (17)
and consequently, we estimate the following equation:
ln
(
rdit
)
= γd0 +
∑
γdt Dt + h (kit,mit, nit) + vit (18)
with error term vit originating from the cubic function proxy procedure.
Likewise, export sales in equation (7) is rewritten in logs as:
ln
(
rexit
)
= (1 − σex) ln
(
σex
σex − 1
)
+ ln
(
Φext
)
+ ln
(
zexit
)
+ (1 − σex) (β0 + βk ln (kit) + βw ln (wt) − ωit)
and rearranging terms gives:
ln
(
rexit
)
= γex0 +
∑
γext Dt + (1 − σex) (βk ln (kit) − ωit) + ln
(
zexit
)
(19)
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Since equation (17) gives the following relationship:
(1 − σex) (βk ln (kit) − ωit) = (1 − σex)(1 − σd) (h (kit,mit, nit) + vit) (20)
plugging equation (20) into equation (19) yields the estimation equation for export sales:
ln
(
rexit
) − (1 − σex)
(1 − σd) (h (kit,mit, nit) + vit) = γ
ex
0 +
∑
γext Dt + ln
(
zexit
)
(21)
that enables us to recover firm-specific export demand shifters as residuals from the above regres-
sion with intercepts and time dummies. Note that we have obtained the estimate of (h(kit,mit, nit) +
vit) from the regression of equation (18) above.
Having recovered firm-specific export demand shifters zexit , we are able to solve equation (14)
and get the quasi-ratio in (15). Still, however, domestic and export market aggregate demand levels
are not identified separately, and we need to take one last step of normalization. Our strategy is
to back out each aggregate demand level separately, by setting the mean of log marginal costs to
zero.
In practice, we plug price equation in (2) into equation (13) after using the fact that quantity is
revenue divided by price (i.e., q jit = r
j
it/p
j
it):
MRdit
MRexit
=
(
σd−1
σd
)σd−1
σd
(
rdit
) −1
σd
(
Φdt
) 1
σd(
σex−1
σex
)σex−1
σex
(
rexit
) −1
σex (Φext ) 1σex (zexit ) 1σex (MCit)
(
1
σd
− 1σex
)
= 1 (22)
Taking logarithms of the above equation, and using the solution of the equation (14) provided in
(15), we can get rid of domestic aggregate demand term, Φdt , and keep export aggregate demand,
Φext , as the only unknown parameter:
ln

(
σd − 1
σd
)σd−1
σd (
rdit
) −1
σd
 − ln
(σex − 1σex
)σex−1
σex (
rexit
) −1
σex
(
zexit
) 1
σex
 + (σd − 1σd
)
ln Kt
=
(
1
σex
− σd − 1
σex − 1
1
σd
)
ln Φext +
(
1
σd
− 1
σex
)
ln (MCit) (23)
Again, we take domestic sales and export sales from the data, and use estimated elasticities, re-
covered export market shifters as well as the quasi demand ratio in equation (15). Running the
regression of the LHS in equation (23) with time dummies, we can recover the level of aggregate
export demand in each year t, Φext , and we can also back out aggregate domestic demand, Φ
d
t , from
equation (15). Note that these are the normalized estimates with the mean of ln (MCit) being zero.
Lastly, from equation (11) and its export sales equivalent in (12), we can uncover each firm’s price
and quantity sold in each market separately.
Constrained exporters Most of the above equations do not hold for the group of constrained
firms because those equations are mostly derived from the fact that optimal price equals markup
over marginal cost, which is not true for constrained firms. A notable exception is equation (14)
since constrained firms also maximize their profits by equating marginal revenue from each market
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as in equation (9). In addition, although we employed only unconstrained firms to get the results,
the estimated elasticities as well as aggregate demand levels are common to both unconstrained and
constrained firms. Thus, by inputting appropriate values in equation (14) for constrained firms, we
can recover idiosyncratic export demand shifters, zexit , for each of these firms as in:
MRdit
MRexit
= 1⇒
(
σd−1
σd
) (
rdit
) −1
σd−1
(
Φdt
) 1
σd−1(
σex−1
σex
) (
rexit
) −1
σex−1 (Φext ) 1σex−1 =
(
zexit
) 1
σex−1 (24)
Now that we know everything about the firm-level demand curve for this group of firms, we can
find out each firm’s price and quantity sold in each market separately from equation (11) and (12).
This provides information on each of these firms’ actual capacity constraint since by assumption
the capacity constraint is always binding:
qtotit = q
d
it + q
ex
it (25)
Summary Below, we summarize the structural estimation process:
For Unconstrained Exporters:
(a) Run a regression on equation (10), and get σd and σex
(b) Run a regression on equation (18),
and get estimated values of h (kit,mit, nit) + vit
(c) Plug the estimated values in steps (a) and (b) into equation (21),
run a regression,and recover zexit from residuals
(d) Substitute the estimated values in steps (a) and (c) into equation (14),
and get the solution Kt in equation (15)
(e) Use the estimated values in steps (a), (c), and (d), run a regression
on equation (23), and recover Φext and Φ
d
t
(f) Get firm-level price and quantity using equation (11) and (12)
and values from steps (a), (c) and (e)
For Constrained Exporters:
(g) Use the values from steps (a) and (e), and get zexit from equation (24)
(h) Get firm-level price and quantity using equation (11), (12)
and values from steps (a), (e) and (g)
Since non-exporters share the same domestic aggregate demand level and the elasticity of sub-
stitution with exporters, we can also back out their domestic price and quantity sold from equation
(9). Constrained non-exporters are assumed to face the binding constraint: qtotit = q
d
it.
Table 20 reports key parameter estimates from the structural estimation procedure.25
5.3 Counterfactuals I
We perform counterfactual experiments to study the effects of positive export market demand
shocks on total revenue at the industry-level as well as the firm-level. Our underlying assumption
25The estimates of σd−1
σd
and σd−1
σd
are 0.573 and 0.551 with standard errors 0.04 and 0.03, respectively.
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is that unconstrained firms can adjust output freely at its own constant marginal cost, whereas
constrained firms always face binding constraints at total output qtotit found in equation (25). Our
counterfactual scenario is to imagine a one percent increase in aggregate export market demand,
Φext , leaving aggregate domestic market demand, Φ
d
t , unchanged, and calculate hypothetical firm-
level responses. We consider intensive margin adjustments of incumbent exporters only, and do
not account for extensive margin adjustments (i.e., switching in to or out of exporting).26
For unconstrained firms, it is straightforward to get new optimal total sales, because domestic
sales do not change, while exports will increase exactly by one percent. For constrained firms, how-
ever, we need to find new domestic and export sales quantities that still satisfy the sub-optimality
condition in equation (9) with the new aggregate export demand level and the capacity constraint
in equation ( 25) at the same time. This counterfactual result is reported in Table 21.
If we aggregate domestic sales and exports by constrained firms and unconstrained firms sep-
arately, we can see that domestic sales are unchanged and exports increase by one percent for
unconstrained firms. For constrained firms, however, the results indicate that domestic sales de-
crease by around .41%, while export sales increase by around .53%. In terms of total sales, actual
domestic/export sales ratio is such that it increased by around .78% for unconstrained firms, but
only by around .38% for constrained firms. This results in only a .56% increase in total aggregate
sales in response to 1% positive demand shock in export markets. Noting that the industry would
have experienced around a .78% increases in total sales if there were no constrained firms, this
implies that the presence of capacity constrained firms reduces the aggregate sales responses by
around 30% (from .78% to .56%). Looking at aggregate export responses, we find that the pres-
ence of capacity constrained firms reduces the aggregate export responses by around 27% (from
1% to .73%).This suggests a potential role for capacity constraints in explaining the short-run trade
elasticity puzzle as described in Ruhl (2008) among others.
We can consider a similar exercise by introducing a 1% negative demand shock, with results re-
ported in Table 22. This is exactly the mirror image of the earlier case with positive export demand
shocks, and we find that the presence of capacity constrained firms again reduces the aggregate
sales responses by around 30% (from -.78% to -.57%), and the aggregate export responses by 26%
(from -1% to -.74%).
Consequently, the industry’s overall output sensitivity to external demand shocks is dampened
by 30% due to the presence of capacity constrained firms: the industry cannot reap the full benefits
from positive external demand shocks, but can avoid being fully hit by negative external demand
shocks.
5.4 Counterfactuals II
The presence of capacity constraints has a second significant impact on aggregate outcomes.
Welfare is directly affected by the existence of capacity constrained firms, who charge higher prices
than their unconstrained counterparts, thereby raising the aggregate price index and thus lowering
welfare. It follows that we can calculate potential welfare losses from capacity constraints by
comparing actual prices charged by constrained firms with hypothetical prices that would have
26To be able to account for extensive margin adjustments, we need to consider fixed and/or sunk cost estimation,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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been charged by these firms if they had not been constrained.27 Our structural estimation process
provides estimates of actual prices, but hypothetical prices are not available. Since firms would
charge the optimal price as markup over marginal cost when they are not constrained, we need
to estimate firm-level marginal cost, which we have not pursued in this paper. Instead, we make
an assumption that constrained firms’ marginal cost distribution is identical to the marginal cost
distribution of unconstrained firms. Note that we do know unconstrained firms’ marginal costs
because their marginal costs should equal marginal revenues, which are easily recovered from
equation (14) with estimated parameters.
In practice, we let constrained firms pick marginal cost draws randomly from the empirical dis-
tribution function of unconstrained firms’ marginal costs, subject to the condition that constrained
firms’ marginal revenue is greater than the drawn marginal cost level (see equation (9)). With
marginal cost draws picked, we can calculate constrained firms’ optimal prices that would have
been charged had it not been for capacity constraints. Then, we can construct a hypothetical do-
mestic price index by adding unconstrained firms’ actual (optimal) prices. We repeat the procedure
100 times, and compare the hypothetical domestic price index with the actual domestic price index.
Our result suggests that the domestic price index would have been lower by 47% without capac-
ity constraints. When the share of domestic goods consumption is 1/2, this implies that capacity
constraints result in welfare losses of about 23%.28
Alternatively, imagine an economy with resource misallocation (e.g. arising from financial
frictions) such that more efficient firms are capacity constrained. Specifically, we assume that con-
strained firms’ marginal cost distribution follows the bottom 10% of unconstrained firms’ marginal
cost distribution. Repeating the procedure under this misallocation assumption, we find that the
domestic price index would have been 71% lower without capacity constraints, implying welfare
losses of 35% due to the presence of capacity constraints. This suggests that the combination
of capacity constraints and resource misallocation has significant implications for the economy
(additional welfare losses of 12%).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the assumption of constant marginal cost technology, which is im-
plicit or explicit in most theory models of international trade, has predictions about firm-level for-
eign and domestic sales which are inconsistent with the data. We utilize a reduced form approach
to demonstrate a strong negative relationship between domestic sales and exports, measured either
by export status or export sales. Accounting for firm-level productivity growth is important since
its omission tends to create an upward bias on the estimated relationship between domestic sales
and exports. This is evidence against the standard constant marginal cost view.
Furthermore, we explore the sources of this increasing marginal cost technology, and find that
physically and financially constrained firms have significant and large negative correlations be-
tween export and domestic sales. Financial constraints are shown to be at least as important as
physical capacity constraints in contributing to the observed trade-off. This suggests that a con-
stant marginal cost view is inappropriate for internationally integrated firms, and that short-run
27Again, we do not consider extensive margin adjustment effects, and assume that all incumbent firms stay in the
domestic market in the absence of capacity constraints.
28The underlying model for this section is provided in Appendix A.1.
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firm constraints could be quite significant for understanding aggregate outcomes.
Next, we attempt to quantify the importance of these micro frictions for aggregate fluctuations.
Starting with the recent structural work of Aw et al. (2011)), we modify and advance this frame-
work to include capacity constrained firms. Having derived the necessary identifying moments,
we structurally estimate the impact of capacity constrained firms for macroeconomic fluctuation.
Focusing on the largest exporting industry in Indonesia, we find that the presence of capacity con-
strained firm could reduce aggregate output responses to external demand shocks by around 30%.
In addition, we show that capacity constraints could result in welfare losses by about 23%. These
counterfactual estimates suggest that the existence of capacity constrained firms do indeed have
significant aggregate consequences.
In future work, we seek to extend our framework to a dynamic setting, where we can struc-
turally estimate the impact of capacity constrained firms along the extensive margin, including the
recovery of sunk costs associated with exporting.
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Appendix
A. Underlying Model for Welfare Loss Evaluation
This section provides the underlying model framework that is used to quantify the welfare loss
from capacity constraints in section 5.4. We consider a particular upper-tier utility function:
U = CαdC
1−α
imp
which has the corresponding total aggregate price index expressed as:
P = PαdP
1−α
imp
where Pαd is the aggregate price index for domestic goods and P
1−α
imp is the aggregate price index for
imported goods, defined respectively as:
Pd =
[
Σi∈dom
(
pdi
)1−σd] 11−σd
and
Pimp =
[
Σi∈imp
(
pdi
)1−σd] 11−σd
This utility system implies that a constant fraction, α, of total spending is devoted to domestic
goods, irrespective of relative price level of domestic goods to imported goods.29
We can further expand the aggregate price index for domestic goods by distinguishing the
goods produced by constrained firms from those by unconstrained firms:
Pd =
[
Σi∈dom
(
pdi
)1−σd] 11−σd
=
[
Σi∈unconstrained
(
pdi
)1−σd
+ Σi∈constrained
(
pdi
)1−σd] 11−σd
=
Σi∈unconstrained ( σd
σd − 1MCi
)1−σd
+ Σi∈constrained
(
pdi
)1−σd 11−σd
The last expression reflects that unconstrained firms charge optimal prices, which is simply the
markup over marginal costs, whereas constrained firms do not. We also construct a hypotheti-
cal domestic price index that would have been obtained if constrained firms could have charged
optimal prices:
Phypd =
Σi∈unconstrained ( σd
σd − 1MCi
)1−σd
+ Σi∈constrained
(
σd
σd − 1MCi
)1−σd 11−σd
Welfare loss from capacity constrained domestic producers is then calculated by comparing the hy-
pothetical and the actual domestic goods price index, weighted by the domestic goods consumption
share α :
29This in turn implies that the aggregate demand level for domestic goods, Φdt , in equation (1) is expressed as
Φdt = αR
d
t (Pd)
σd , where Rdt is the total spending in the domestic economy.
32
−d ln P = α
[
ln Phypd − ln Pd
]
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Figures
Figure 1: Constant Marginal Cost and Production
Figure 2: Increasing Marginal Cost and Production
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Figure 3: Infinite Marginal Cost and (Sub) Optimal Production
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Tables
All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Rupiah) 5,516 3,554 17,343 21,900 17,246 13,589
Export Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 1,193 0 8,383 10,500 7,123 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 4,323 3,554 8,959 11,435 10,123 13,589
Number of Observations 124,715 106,970 17,745 8,627 3,922 3,085
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Export Status (Indonesian Firms)
Physically Constrained All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Rupiah) 7,060 4,295 17,851 23,463 13,909 17,264
Export Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 2,029 0 9,947 12,415 7,616 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 5,031 4,295 7,904 11,048 6,293 17,264
Number of Observations 8,536 6,795 1,741 820 395 232
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Export Status for Physically Constrained Indonesian Firms
Distressed Financially All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Rupiah) 5,079 3,235 14,357 16,836 15,407 12,613
Export Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 1,205 0 7,266 8,594 6,473 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Rupiah) 3,875 3,235 7,092 8,242 8,934 12,613
Number of Observations 52,250 43,587 8,663 4,148 1,905 1,489
Table 3: Summary Statistics by Export Status for Financially Distressed Indonesian Firms
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All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Pesos) 4,282 1,682 13,966 15,264 10,851 11,471
Export Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 1,455 0 6,873 7,521 6,001 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 2,827 1,682 7,093 7,743 4,850 11,471
Number of Observations 59,730 47,087 12,643 9,087 1,143 1,151
Table 4: Summary Statistics by Export Status (Chilean Firms)
Physically Constrained All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Pesos) 4,354 1,678 15,031 16,137 5,231 15,009
Export Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 1,612 0 8,044 8,834 1,049 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 2,742 1,678 6,987 7,304 4,181 15,009
Number of Observations 20,215 16,164 4,051 3,640 411 489
Table 5: Summary Statistics by Export Status for Physically Constrained Chilean Firms
Distressed Financially All Firms Non-exporters Exporters Continuing Exporters Starters Stoppers
Total Output (in 1,000 Pesos) 2,518 1,091 6,620 7,352 3,984 2,819
Export Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 615 0 2,383 2,726 572 0
Domestic Sales (in 1,000 Pesos) 1,903 1,091 4,237 4,626 3,412 2,819
Number of Observations 26,133 19,390 6,743 4,902 538 554
Table 6: Summary Statistics by Export Status for Financially Constrained Chilean Firms
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4
Starter -0.99 -0.99 -0.97 -0.98
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Stopper 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
Sector-year FE no yes no yes
Firm FE no no yes yes
Observations 81,119 81,119 81,119 81,119
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). The Starter indicator is a 1 when a firm
has positive exports in a given year and no export sales in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The Stopper indicator is
a 1 when a firm has no export sales in a given year but had positive exports in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. A
constant term is included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year
level and provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 7: Starter/Stopper Indonesian Firms
∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5
Starter -1.01 -1.01 -0.99 -0.96 -0.97
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Stopper 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.91
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
∆ ln(productivity):
Labor 0.48 0.48 0.45
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
TFP Growth 0.34
(0.01)***
Levinsohn-Petrin 0.31
(0.01)***
Sector-year FE no yes yes yes yes
Firm FE no no yes yes yes
Observations 81,119 81,119 81,119 65,090 64,909
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). The Starter indicator is a 1 when a firm
has positive exports in a given year and no export sales in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The Stopper indicator
is a 1 when a firm has no export sales in a given year but had positive exports in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
Productivity in this regression is labor productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in
columns 1, 2, and 3. Column 4 reports the regression result with productivity as TFP deviation from the sector-year
mean. Column 5 reports the regression result with productivity estimated using the methodology of Levisohn and
Petrin (2008). A constant term is included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered
at the sector-year level and provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 8: Starter/Stopper Indonesian Firms with Productivity
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Starter -0.98 -0.29 -0.27 -0.32 -0.29 -0.36
(0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Stopper 0.94 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.24
(0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Intensive Exporter -1.42 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 -1.39
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Lag Intensive Exporter 1.40 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.40
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Physically Constrained 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.02)** (0.02)*** (0.02)*
starter*physical -0.30 -0.38 -0.31
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)***
Financially Constrained -0.21 -0.21 0.03
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
starter*financial 0.00 -0.01 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
∆ ln(productivity) 0.43
(0.01)***
Sector-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,119 81,119 81,119 68,669 68,669 68,669
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). The Starter indicator is a 1 when a firm
has positive exports in a given year and no export sales in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The Stopper indicator
is a 1 when a firm has no export sales in a given year but had positive exports in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
Intensive Exporter dummy is 1 for firms exporting more than 50% of total output and 0 otherwise. Productivity in
this regression is labor productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed). Intensive Exporter
dummy is 1 for firms exporting more than 50% of total output and 0 otherwise. Physical capacity constraint dummy
is 1 for firms with 100% capacity utilization and 0 otherwise. Financial capacity constraint dummy is 1 for firms
with a (cash-flow)/(asset) ratio in the bottom 50% for each year and 0 otherwise. A constant term is included in
each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and provided in
parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 9: Starter/Stopper Indonesian Firms with Constraints
∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4
∆ ln(export sales) -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)*** (0.03) ***
Sector-year FE no yes no yes
Firm FE no no yes yes
Observations 7,183 7,183 7,183 7,183
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). A constant term is included in each
regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and provided in
parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 10: Export Sales - Domestic Sales Trade-offs (Indonesian Firms)
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5
∆ ln(export sales) -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.18 -0.16
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
∆ ln(productivity):
Labor 0.35 0.34 0.32
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
TFP Growth 0.27
(0.03)***
Levinsohn-Petrin 0.26
(0.03)***
Sector-year FE no yes yes yes yes
Firm FE no no yes yes yes
Observations 7,183 7,183 7,183 6,091 6,065
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). Productivity in this regression is labor
productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in columns 1, 2, and 3. Column 4 reports the
regression result with productivity as TFP deviation from the sector-year mean. Column 5 reports the regression
result with productivity estimated using the methodology of Levisohn and Petrin (2008). A constant term is included
in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and provided in
parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 11: Export Sales - Domestic Sales Trade-offs with Productivity(Indonesian Firms)
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Labor Prod TFP Prod LP Prod
∆ ln(export sales) -0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
(0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Physically Constrained 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
∆ ln(export sales)*physical -0.23 -0.27 -0.26 -0.29 -0.27
(0.09)** (0.11)** (0.10)** (0.11)*** (0.11)***
Financially Constrained -0.24 -0.24 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
∆ ln(export sales)*financial -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 -0.19 -0.18
(0.09)** (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.09)** (0.09)**
∆ ln(productivity) 0.30 0.25 0.24
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Sector-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7,183 7,183 6,305 6,305 6,305 6,091 6,065
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). Productivity in this regression is labor
productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in column 5. Column 6 reports the regression
result with productivity as TFP deviation from the sector-year mean. Column 7 reports the regression result with
productivity estimated using the methodology of Levisohn and Petrin (2008). Physical capacity constraint dummy
is 1 for firms with 100% capacity utilization and 0 otherwise. Financial capacity constraint dummy is 1 for firms
with a (cash-flow)/(asset) ratio in the bottom 50% for each year and 0 otherwise. A constant term is included in
each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and provided in
parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 12: Export Sales - Domestic Sales Trade-offs with Constraints (Indonesian Firms)
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Chile Chile Chile Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Starter -0.11 0.00 1,123 -0.93 -0.57 3,354
Stopper 0.15 0.08 1,133 1.04 0.73 2,566
Continuer (Exporter) 0.05 0.04 8,749 0.07 0.04 7,196
Continuing Non-Exporter 0.01 0.02 35,653 0.06 0.03 68,003
Table 14: Mean and Median Sales by Export Status (Chilean and Indonesian Firms)
Chile Chile Chile Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Non-intensive Starters 0.04 0.02 1,015 -0.04 -0.10 1,629
Intensive Starters -1.50 -1.40 108 -1.76 -1.55 1,725
Non-intensive Stoppers 0.03 0.07 1,043 0.22 0.23 1,275
Intensive Stoppers 1.59 1.49 90 1.85 1.62 1,291
Notes: Intensive Starters are defined as firms that begin exporting at more than 50% of their total output. Non-intensive
starters are all other firms that begin exporting. Intensive Stoppers are defined as firms that stop exporting, but in the
previous year were exporting more than 50% of their total output. Non-intensive Stoppers are defined as all other
firms that stop exporting.
Table 15: Mean and Median Sales by Export Status and Intensity (Chilean and Indonesian Firms)
∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chile Chile Chile Chile Chile Indonesia
Starter -0.14 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.99
(0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)***
Stopper 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.94
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)***
∆ ln(productivity) 0.19 0.45
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
Sector-year FE no yes no yes yes yes
Firm FE no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 46,658 46,658 46,658 46,658 45,922 81,119
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). The Starter indicator is a 1 when a firm
has positive exports in a given year and no export sales in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The Stopper indicator
is a 1 when a firm has no export sales in a given year but had positive exports in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
Productivity in this regression is labor productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in
columns 5 and 6. A constant term is included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are
clustered at the sector-year level and provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 16: Starter/Stopper Chilean Firms
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Chile Chile Chile Chile Chile Chile Indonesia
Starter -0.16 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.36
(0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03) (0.02)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)***
Stopper 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.24
(0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)***
Intensive Exporter -0.98 -0.96 -0.88 -0.87 -0.85 -1.39
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)***
Lag Intensive Exporter 1.00 0.94 0.85 0.85 0.85 1.40
(0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)***
Physically Constrained -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.04
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*
starter*physical -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.31
(0.04)** (0.04)*** (0.04)** (0.09)***
Financially Constrained -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.03
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
starter*financial 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.08
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.03) (0.06)
∆ ln(productivity) 0.16 0.43
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
Sector-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 46,658 46,658 43,285 40,038 38,788 38,349 68,669
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). The Starter indicator is a 1 when a firm
has positive exports in a given year and no export sales in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The Stopper indicator
is a 1 when a firm has no export sales in a given year but had positive exports in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
Intensive Exporter dummy is 1 for firms exporting more than 50% of total output and 0 otherwise. Productivity in
this regression is labor productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed). Physical capacity
constraint dummy is 1 for firms with 100% capacity utilization and 0 otherwise. Financial capacity constraint dummy
is 1 for firms with a (cash-flow)/(asset) ratio in the bottom 50% for each year and 0 otherwise. A constant term is
included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and
provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 17: Starter/Stopper Chilean Firms with Constraints
∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∆ ln(export sales) -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
∆ ln(productivity) 0.18 0.17 0.17
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Sector-year FE no yes no yes no yes yes
Firm FE no no yes yes no no yes
Observations 8,749 8,749 8,749 8,749 8,586 8,586 8,586
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). Productivity in this regression is labor
productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in columns 5, 6, and 7. A constant term is
included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and
provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 18: Export Sales - Domestic Sales Trade-offs (Chilean Firms)
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∆ ln(domestic sales) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chile Chile Chile Chile Chile Indonesia
∆ ln(export sales) -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07
(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)** (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
Physically Constrained -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
∆ ln(export sales)*physical -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.26
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.10)**
Financially Constrained -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.05)
∆ ln(export sales)*financial -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.16
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.08)**
∆ ln(productivity) 0.14 0.30
(0.02)*** (0.03)***
Sector-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8,749 8,257 7,087 6,974 6,885 6,305
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly change in log(domestic sales). Productivity in this regression is labor
productivity measured as (value added outputs)/(total labor employed) in columns 5 and 6. Physical capacity
constraint dummy is 1 for firms with 100% capacity utilization and 0 otherwise. Financial capacity constraint dummy
is 1 for firms with a (cash-flow)/(asset) ratio in the bottom 50% for each year and 0 otherwise. A constant term is
included in each regression and omitted in the table. All standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level and
provided in parentheses. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 19: Export Sales - Domestic Sales Trade-offs with Constraints (Chilean Firms)
σd = 2.35 σex = 2.2
Φd1990 = 1, 104, 561 Φ
ex
1990 = 2, 491, 660
Φd1991 = 1, 057, 013 Φ
ex
1991 = 3, 723, 407
Φd1992 = 1, 415, 523 Φ
ex
1992 = 3, 760, 982
Φd1993 = 1, 100, 565 Φ
ex
1993 = 4, 125, 749
Φd1994 = 1, 055, 139 Φ
ex
1994 = 5, 333, 864
Φd1995 = 1, 162, 663 Φ
ex
1995 = 3, 917, 337
Φd1996 = 1, 126, 510 Φ
ex
1996 = 4, 123, 405
Table 20: Implied Parameter Values
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Unconstrained firms’ sales growth in Constrained firms’ sales growth in Aggregate
year Domestic Exports Total Domestic Exports Total Exports Total
1990 0.00% 1.00% 0.69% -0.40% 0.53% 0.38% 0.68% 0.50%
1991 0.00% 1.00% 0.77% -0.50% 0.55% 0.38% 0.69% 0.52%
1992 0.00% 1.00% 0.75% -0.37% 0.53% 0.37% 0.75% 0.56%
1993 0.00% 1.00% 0.79% -0.41% 0.52% 0.39% 0.72% 0.57%
1994 0.00% 1.00% 0.81% -0.43% 0.54% 0.38% 0.75% 0.58%
1995 0.00% 1.00% 0.80% -0.41% 0.53% 0.38% 0.75% 0.58%
1996 0.00% 1.00% 0.83% -0.39% 0.54% 0.37% 0.80% 0.63%
mean 0.00% 1.00% 0.78% -0.41% 0.53% 0.38% 0.73% 0.56%
Table 21: One Percent Positive External Demand Shock
Unconstrained firms sales growth in Constrained firms’ sales growth in Aggregate
year Domestic Exports Total Domestic Exports Total Exports Total
1990 0.00% -1.00% -0.70% 0.40% -0.53% -0.39% -0.70% -0.51%
1991 0.00% -1.00% -0.78% 0.23% -0.50% -0.38% -0.70% -0.52%
1992 0.00% -1.00% -0.75% 0.38% -0.54% -0.38% -0.76% -0.56%
1993 0.00% -1.00% -0.80% 0.41% -0.53% -0.39% -0.73% -0.57%
1994 0.00% -1.00% -0.81% 0.43% -0.54% -0.38% -0.76% -0.59%
1995 0.00% -1.00% -0.80% 0.41% -0.54% -0.38% -0.75% -0.58%
1996 0.00% -1.00% -0.83% 0.39% -0.55% -0.37% -0.81% -0.63%
mean 0.00% -1.00% -0.78% 0.38% -0.53% -0.38% -0.74% -0.57%
Table 22: One Percent Negative External Demand Shock
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